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Going Against the Grain of 
Optimism: Flour Fortification 
in Pakistan
Natasha Ansari, Rashid Mehmood and Haris Gazdar
Abstract Food fortification is a popular strategy for addressing ‘hidden 
hunger’, and staple foods are seen as promising, if unproven, vehicles for 
the delivery of essential micronutrients to poor people in developing 
countries. This article examines wheat flour fortification with iron in 
Pakistan as a case of technocratic optimism in the face of institutional 
constraints. An evaluative framework based on the analysis of entire value 
chains can provide a reality check on technocratic optimism. We find 
that poor people based their preferences for different types of flour on 
price as well as perceptions of nutritional value. Many of these flour types 
are not covered by fortification programmes. Fortification interventions, 
meanwhile, have attempted to leverage public–private partnerships in a 
segment of the wheat flour value chain which is beset with regulatory 
weakness. This article illustrates why technical interventions should support 
rather than ignore a broader agenda of reforms in food policy.
Keywords: wheat, wheat flour, grain, fortification, value chains, 
Pakistan, agriculture, nutrition, food systems, INGOs.
1 Introduction
Pakistan has high rates of  stunting and wasting among children, and 
high rates of  iron deficiency among adult women and children alike. 
Cereals contribute around half  the energy intake in Pakistan and 
wheat dominates all other cereals (Gazdar and Mysorewala 2016). 
The standard meal includes flat wheat flour bread or roti – cooked 
either on a hot plate as chapati (flat bread) or baked in a clay oven 
as naan (leavened bread traditionally cooked in a clay oven) – as its 
main starchy component. Wheat flour has, therefore, been seen as a 
promising vehicle for addressing anaemia through iron fortification 
(Gaffey et al. 2014). The high prevalence of  wheat flour consumption, 
which makes wheat a favourable vehicle for fortification is, in fact, 
a sign of  undernourishment – wheat flour is the cheapest source of  
energy. Even so, around two-fifths of  the country’s population consume 
less than 2,100 kilocalories per day (Balagamwala and Gazdar 2013). 
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Hunger directly affects around one third of  households. A nationally 
representative survey found that one tenth of  households had 
experienced severe hunger while another 20 per cent had experienced 
moderate hunger (Government of  Pakistan 2011).
The appeal of  wheat flour fortification, evidence notwithstanding, 
is clear from the number of  attempts at establishing fortification 
programmes (Zuberi, Mehmood and Gazdar 2016). There have been 
at least seven wheat flour fortification interventions in Pakistan – two 
national and five regional – since 2005. Independent evaluations are 
not publicly available for any of  these. The largest programme was the 
National Wheat Flour Fortification Programme (NWFFP) led by the 
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) with technical support 
from Nutrition International (NI, formerly Micronutrient Initiative). 
NI has been involved in one way or another in all interventions since 
then (MI 2015). The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is 
another key participant. At the time when fieldwork for this case study 
was carried out, the only operational project was a WFP and NI project 
in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) region. NI is also a technical 
partner in the consortium, implementing an ambitious new national 
fortification programme supported by UK Aid (DFID 2016b).
All of  the interventions follow a similar model. They work with licensed 
private sector flour mills to create capacity for fortification, provide the 
pre-mix, conduct social marketing campaigns to increase awareness about 
the benefits of  consuming fortified flour, and lobby for the mandatory 
fortification of  flour and for the setting up of  systems of  quality 
assurance. These are, in fact, common elements in food fortification 
programmes across developing countries. This article proposes to study 
wheat flour fortification programmes as a case study of  technocratic 
optimism in the face of  stubborn institutional constraints. We believe that 
the case study bears relevance for countries where comparable models of  
intervention have been championed or implemented, and for a broader 
agenda of  pro-nutrition food policy reform.
Section 2 sets our framing of  the case study and its methodology. Wheat 
flour value chains are described in Section 3, where we also anticipate 
issues for the design of  wheat flour fortification interventions. Section 4 
reports our observations from the fortification project in AJK. Case 
study findings are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the 
article and draws out broader lessons for nutrition interventions.
2 Framing and methodology
2.1 Technocratic optimism
‘Technocratic optimism’ – or the belief  that there are viable 
technological solutions to structural problems – has been identified 
as a powerful driver of  champions of  technology-based interventions 
(May et al. 2003).1 An insightful study of  the process of  introducing a 
new technology into health systems speaks of  ‘ideation’ as a level in the 
discourse where ‘general notions about the definition and production of  
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both a new technology and reliable knowledge about it are formed and 
circulated’ (May et al. 2003: 701). The processes and actions analysed 
by May et al. (2003) in the context of  health systems could easily apply 
to the role of  champions such as the American Medical Association in 
the 1920s and 1930s (Bishai and Nalubola 2002), or The Lancet 2013 
Nutrition Series (e.g. Bhutta et al. 2013) in the current discourse on 
food fortification. Positive but inconclusive evidence on the reduction in 
anaemia through food fortification (e.g. Gera, Sachdev and Boy 2012; 
Das et al. 2013) has been deemed ‘reliable knowledge’ on which to 
base strong advocacy for an intervention for which there is no specific 
evidence, viz. wheat flour fortification in countries such as Pakistan.2
Moreover, as public–private partnership models have progressively 
replaced government or donor-administered programmes in developing 
countries (Danton-Hill 1998; Yach et al. 2010), food fortification 
champions such as GAIN have constructed persuasive narratives that 
link technocratic optimism with corporate power. The linear output-
oriented approach of  these narratives predisposes them towards 
ignoring broader issues and causes of  hunger and malnutrition (Kaan 
and Liese 2010). A fortification programme, after all, is more complex 
and involves coordinated actions by a range of  players, than a tightly 
administered trial.3
2.2 Value chains perspective
The resistance to evidence of  particular models of  wheat flour 
fortification interventions in Pakistan and elsewhere suggests a need 
for broader evaluative frameworks that can make explicit some of  the 
structural, institutional, and behavioural constraints which technocratic 
optimism overlooks. Although it emerged initially as a tool for business 
strategy, the value chains perspective gained wider applicability for an 
understanding of  how private business might contribute to public policy 
goals such as nutrition.4 A value chain ‘is described by the series of  
activities and actors along the supply chain, and what and where value 
is added in the chain for and by these activities and actors’ (Hawkes and 
Ruel 2011: 3).
Maestre, Poole and Henson (2017) developed a simple framework to aid 
the design and assessment of  sustainable public–private interventions 
for improving the nutrition of  vulnerable populations through the 
consumption of  nutrient-dense food useful for correcting biases such 
as technocratic optimism. Based on an extensive review of  existing 
literature on agri-food value chains, their framework proposes a 
checklist of  requirements which must be met with respect to producer 
incentives, consumer behaviour, and coordination, for the success of  an 
intervention:
 l On the consumer side, the intervention must factor in awareness 
about the nutritional value of  the food, and needs to ensure that the 
food is available, acceptable in terms of  tastes and cultural norms, 
and affordable, for the target population.
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 l For the intervention to be successful, the private sector must respond 
to incentives and be able to capture value along the value chain, and 
public policy must play an effective role with respect to coordination 
and regulation.
This system-wide view of  an intervention is particularly useful for 
bringing perspectives from agriculture and food policy to bear on 
nutrition interventions which tend to be driven by health programming. 
We, therefore, use the Maestre et al. (2017) framework to map elements 
of  the wheat flour value chain in Pakistan – including producer 
incentives, consumer behaviour, and regulatory governance – to place 
the generic model of  the wheat flour fortification intervention in its 
broader institutional context. We probe whether and to what extent 
this intervention fulfils the requirements set out in Maestre et al. (2017), 
technocratic expectations notwithstanding.
2.3 Methodology
We draw on three sources to trace the wheat flour value chain 
in Pakistan: existing studies and reviews of  the wheat sector and 
fortification projects; a representative sample survey of  consumers 
in (wheat-growing) rural areas of  Sindh Province; and qualitative 
fieldwork including interviews with stakeholders with interests along 
the value chain including policymakers, project implementers, farmers, 
millers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers.5 Community-level 
qualitative research was carried out to understand consumer behaviour 
and preferences, and producer incentives. We conducted in-depth 
household interviews to probe factors behind consumer (and producer) 
choices with respect to the acquisition, storage, and use of  wheat and 
wheat flour.
Three types of  sites were purposively selected. First, we visited 
rural communities in a wheat-growing region of  Sindh Province 
to understand both the producer end of  the value chain as well as 
consumption patterns in a setting where locally produced wheat was 
in abundant supply. Second, low- to middle-income localities in the 
metropolis of  Karachi were selected to gain insights into consumer 
behaviour in a market-dominated setting. Third, we wanted to observe 
a wheat flour fortification project at work. The only opportunity at the 
time of  the fieldwork was in the region of  AJK which had an ongoing 
fortification programme. We had aimed to interview informants in 
rural as well as urban areas in that region but were unable to visit rural 
sites due to security considerations. The main respondents in these 
communities were women and men in households with young children 
who were interviewed about any interaction they had with the wheat 
value chain – as producers and consumers. Although all our survey sites 
were relatively low-income communities, we took care to ensure that our 
respondents included the more marginalised individuals and households 
as well as the somewhat better-off ones.
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3 Wheat flour value chains
3.1 Grain to flour
Pakistan grows around 23 million tonnes of  wheat annually and 
domestic output is sufficient, in most years, to satisfy consumer demand 
(Pakistan, Ministry of  National Food Security and Research 2014–15). 
Wheat is grown across the country, particularly in the irrigated plains 
of  Punjab and Sindh which account for around nine-tenths of  the 
total harvest (ibid.). The government occupies a strategic position in a 
sector otherwise dominated by the private sector. At harvest time, its 
procurement agencies – notably provincial food departments – purchase 
around a quarter of  the crop at an officially designated support price. 
Government stock is subsequently sold to private mills at subsidised 
prices. The government’s involvement in the wheat economy is seen 
as the main plank of  the country’s food security policy, which revolves 
around ensuring domestic stocks of  wheat and preventing shortages and 
price spirals in urban markets (Gazdar 2015).
There is no precise data about other uses of  the crop, but it is estimated 
that private traders and mills directly buy between 15 and 19 per cent 
of  the harvest. Farmers are, therefore, thought to retain over 60 per cent 
of  the harvest in the first instance. Only around half  that amount is kept 
for self-consumption or seed. The rest is either used as in-kind payments 
(including to harvest labourers), or sold to private sector buyers.6
3.1.1 Alternative value chains: chakkis and mills
There are two alternate value chains for producing wheat flour: 
small-scale, traditional, community-level chakkis and large-scale flour mills 
spread across the country. Virtually all the grain which does not enter the 
market, such as that which is retained for self-consumption by farmers 
or is earned by labourers as in-kind payment, goes through a local chakki. 
For grain that customers bring for grinding, the chakki charges a small fee. 
The chakki system is the predominant value chain in wheat-growing rural 
areas of  Punjab and Sindh, by which grain is crushed into wholewheat 
flour.7 Chakkis are not limited to rural areas; they are common in cities too. 
Chakkis also buy grain from the market, which is particularly the case in 
urban areas where customers do not, typically, have their own grain stores.
The second method is processing through large-scale flour mills spread 
across the country. These mills acquire grain from two sources. Licensed 
mills are supplied grain from government stocks at subsidised prices, 
and they are also free to buy grain from the open market. Nearly all 
of  the grain procured by the government eventually ends up being 
processed in a licensed flour mill. Mills produce a range of  varieties of  
flour from ‘regular’ to ‘fine’ qualities.
The relationship between government agencies (primarily the 
provincial food department) and privately owned licensed flour mills 
currently revolves around three parameters. One, mills are assigned 
quotas according to their processing capacities and their supply of  
government-procured grain is determined by this quota. Two, a mill 
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is obliged to produce a requisite quantity of  regular flour against the 
supply of  grain. Three, the ex-mill price of  regular flour, whether it 
is made from government-supplied grain or grain acquired from the 
market, is agreed between the government and the mills association.8 
This price is set by taking into account processing costs and other 
margins which are negotiated between the millers and the government. 
Industry sources claim that while all atta (flour) is subject to the food 
department’s price regulation, ‘fine’ qualities with low bran content 
(or maida) are not. The average price of  the all-purpose maida flour in 
2016 was anywhere between 7 and 47 per cent higher than the price 
of  regular flour in the same market. This price differential suggests that 
there might be incentives for the mills to divert some of  their allocation 
of  subsidised grain towards maida production.
3.2 Wheat economy of households
3.2.1 Wheat-growing rural region
Our sample survey of  households in rural Sindh provided insights into 
consumption patterns in wheat-producing areas. Of  the 939 households 
that reported using wheat flour roti as their main staple food, around two 
thirds had some grain from the harvest – either from their crop, or as 
in-kind payment for work done. But only 18 per cent had sufficient grain 
to last them the whole year. Others either bought grain to take to chakkis 
or bought flour. Nearly three-fifths of  the wheat-consuming households 
in our sample (59 per cent) worried about not having enough food to 
eat. A third of  the households reported that adults had gone to bed 
hungry at least once in the previous month, and in 19.3 per cent of  the 
households even children had slept hungry in the last month.
During in-depth interviews in the wheat-growing region, the issue 
of  quality came up in most conversations about different sources of  
flour. The experience of  Raheela, whose family does not own land but 
receives grain for wages, was fairly typical:
We get compensated with wheat grain for our labour. We use one maund 
[a unit of  weight, equal to about 40kg] every five or six days – we have a big 
family. When there is no work, we end up buying sarkari [government] flour 
from the local shop. The shop doesn’t keep chakki flour. We prefer chakki 
flour – we don’t like the consistency of  milled flour. It feels like chewing gum 
and is sometimes white and at other times black, and causes stomach aches. 
(Raheela, age 27, Naushero Feroze District)9
Although mills can produce atta using either government or privately 
acquired grain, most respondents mill flour with the government system. 
Besides perceptions about quality in terms of  freshness and adulteration, 
consumers in the wheat-growing area also expressed their preference for 
freshly ground chakki flour, referring to its nutritional value:
There is ‘strength’ in the real [pure] grain, not in the factory-milled flour which 
is mixed with other stuff. We prefer getting and storing grain to flour, because 
we get it crushed as needed. We like fresh flour. Grain has its own vitamins, but 
loose flour is adulterated. (Hamid, age 40, Naushero Feroze District)
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3.2.2 Urban areas
We were surprised to find a strong preference for chakki flour in both of  
the Karachi fieldwork sites. In Azam Basti, along with factory-milled flour, 
a local chakki was also a main source of  flour – and unlike communities in 
the wheat-growing areas, chakki flour was available all year round.
My husband brings 5kg of  wheat which lasts a week. We make chapati. The 
shop is close by. Chakki flour is fresh and healthier. Flour from the mills is 
often stale. (Saima, age 36, Azam Basti, Karachi)
Bhittaiabad, by contrast, has stronger rural linkages, as many of  its 
residents are recent rural–urban migrants. Residents brought grain from 
their villages to the city and used a local chakki much in the same way as 
their rural counterparts – that is, to grind their own grain.
We buy wheat from our village in Sindh and bring it over by bus. My husband 
or some other family member who visits the village brings it with them. We 
bring 40–60kg, and grind 25kg at a time. This lasts us a month. We don’t 
have our own land but our village has a lot of  wheat so my husband buys it 
at harvest time. The flour made from this wheat tastes good, and its roti has 
a nice colour. We don’t buy milled flour. Our own wheat is better. (Huma, 
age 25, Bhittaiabad, Karachi)
Like their rural counterparts, many in Bhittaiabad are unable to stock 
up enough grain to last them the whole year. They need to rely on 
alternatives. Some opt for milled flour because it is cheaper than that 
from the chakki. Interviews with other informants in Karachi, including 
shopkeepers, confirm the availability of  various types of  flour – chakki as 
well as different grades of  milled flour.
In the city of  Muzaffarabad in AJK, we did not come across chakkis or 
chakki flour. This region does not have very much wheat cultivation and 
relies on milled flour. It is also a region where a wheat flour fortification 
initiative is currently active, with the claim that local mills (nearly all of  
which depend on government-supplied grain) are part of  the programme. 
While most households we interviewed bought industrially milled flour, 
none were aware of  the availability or benefits of  fortified flour. ‘Fine’ 
flour (maida) is popular here and we were told that regular coarse flour, 
known in this area as ‘red flour’, is considered to be an inferior product 
and is consumed mostly by urban poor people and rural households. 
Some of  the reasons for the unpopularity of  mill atta here are similar to 
those in the wheat-growing region. It is suspected that red flour is made 
from poor quality grain and contains adulterants and impurities.
3.3 Issues highlighted for wheat flour fortification interventions
Past, current, and planned fortification interventions in Pakistan share 
one essential feature: they work with the industrial mill segment of  
the wheat flour value chain. This is in line with the view of  influential 
international organisations that regard industrially milled flour as 
‘fortifiable’ (WHO et al. 2009).10 These organisations recommend 
fortification as a viable strategy in countries where a large proportion of  
64 | Ansari et al. Going Against the Grain of Optimism: Flour Fortification in Pakistan
Vol. 49 No. 1 January 2018: ‘Value Chains for Nutrition in South Asia: Who Delivers, How, and to Whom?’
the flour that is consumed is milled industrially. Moreover, fortification 
interventions in Pakistan seek to leverage existing public–private 
partnership between government (mostly provincial food departments) 
and licensed mills which are members of  the Pakistan Flour Mills 
Association (PFMA). Our review of  the wheat flour value chain reveals 
a number of  institutional issues that are pertinent to the viability and 
success of  wheat flour fortification interventions.
3.3.1 Data gaps
First, there are significant gaps in the data on key aspects of  the wheat 
economy. While the PFMA website (PFMA 2016) reports a total of  
915 mills across the country, other sources give divergent numbers.11 The 
mills association publishes data on the aggregate milling capacity of  its 
members, but no data are available on their utilisation of  grain or their 
output of  atta or maida. Gaffey et al. (2014) assert that around half  of  all 
households acquire their flour from the mills without citing a source. A 
key informant from an international non-governmental organisation 
(INGO) involved in a fortification programme was of  the view that mills 
account for around 60 per cent of  all flour consumed in the country. 
Other sources speculate that mills cater to the consumption needs of  
around 40 per cent of  the population (Prikhodko and Zrilyi 2013). There 
is no precise data on the number of  chakkis either – estimates range from 
6,000 (a key informant from an INGO), 7,925 (a representative of  the 
PFMA, Awan 2015) to 30,000 (Gaffey et al. 2014).
3.3.2 Consumer constraints and choices
Second, factors which determine the availability and consumption 
of  fortifiable flour in preference to its alternatives vary across income 
groups and regions. For many of  the poorest, the most salient 
nutritional issue is the acquisition of  sufficient amounts of  flour or 
bread to stave off hunger. But even families, such as that of  Raheela 
mentioned previously, who opt for the cheapest alternative available, 
have a clear preference for particular types of  flour. Rural consumers in 
wheat-growing areas, as well as urban migrants from those areas, prefer 
freshly ground chakki flour for its texture, taste, and the perception of  
‘goodness’. In non-wheat-growing areas and urban centres that have 
historically relied on milled flour (made from government issued wheat), 
coarse flour is considered to be an inferior product and the more 
expensive ‘fine’ flour (maida) is associated with upward mobility.
There is a seasonal element in the availability of  different types of  flour in 
the various regions. Wheat is harvested from March to May, and consumers 
in the wheat-growing regions maintain post-harvest stocks which last them 
several months. From around January onwards, most rural households rely 
on the market for their flour – either on local chakkis which have their own 
grain stores or on mill flour. The formal value chain around the larger flour 
mills also operates seasonally. While government procurement operations 
take place at harvest time, supplies from this stock begin only from around 
September and carry on until the next harvest. The availability of  different 
grades of  mill flour also varies seasonally and by region.
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3.3.3 Prices and efficiency
Third, the wheat procurement and supply system has given rise to 
several types of  inefficiencies. The government ends up with a virtual 
monopoly in the stock of  wheat grain in most wheat-deficit areas. 
According to a Food and Agriculture Organization of  the United 
Nations (FAO) study (Prikhodko and Zrilyi 2013), there is little incentive 
for the private sector to invest in storage capacity if  the government is 
expected to subsidise the cost of  holding stocks. Licensed private sector 
mills are then allocated quotas of  subsidised grain from government 
stocks. The quotas are determined by mill size and this accounts for 
overinvestment in or over-reporting of  milling capacity (Dorosh and 
Salam 2008). Prikhodko and Zrilyi (2013) estimate that the issue price 
of  wheat to flour mills includes a subsidy element of  around 15 per 
cent. The retail price of  chakki flour, however, is only around 10 per cent 
higher than mill atta, and it remains competitive despite the industrial 
scale and public subsidy enjoyed by the modern value chain.
3.3.4 Regulatory weaknesses
The observations above point to regulatory weaknesses in the wheat 
economy, particularly in the relationship between government and mills. 
The absence of  precise data on key aspects of  the value chain underlines 
the lack of  transparency in the utilisation of  the public subsidy. Negative 
consumer perceptions about mill atta point to inadequate incentives and 
sanctions to ensure quality. The system has introduced costly distortions, 
and is unable to pass on the benefit of  subsidies and industrial scale to 
consumers. Wheat fortification interventions seek to leverage existing 
public–private partnerships in a segment of  the wheat flour value chain 
which is beset with regulatory lapses.
4 Fortification programmes
4.1 Fieldwork findings in Azad Jammu and Kashmir
There are 11 licensed flour mills in AJK, and apart from two mills in 
Mirpur which have special permission to buy some grain privately from 
Punjab Province, all of  them rely exclusively on government-supplied 
grain. The mills are NI partners and, as such, have agreed to produce 
only fortified flour.12 Fortified flour is available with retailers who act 
as licensed dealers. Other shops do not stock it. Most of  the stores we 
visited, however, stocked flour from mills located in Punjab or elsewhere. 
We found only one licensed depot across Muzaffarabad and did not find 
fortified flour in any other retail outlet. Some shops stocked a local brand 
which had the tagline ‘full of  nutrition’ on the packaging, but there was 
no specific mention of  fortification on the bag.13 According to millers 
and wholesalers, rural poor people end up buying the fortified flour not 
because they know it is fortified but because they are constrained to 
buying the cheaper ‘red’ flour which happens to be fortified.14
At the one licensed depot that we found, the shopkeeper said he had 
little incentive to sell or keep fortified flour as it had a very small margin 
for him. He said that a 40kg bag of  flour – whether it was fortified or 
not – sold for 1,500 rupees. He bought fortified flour for 1,486 rupees, 
66 | Ansari et al. Going Against the Grain of Optimism: Flour Fortification in Pakistan
Vol. 49 No. 1 January 2018: ‘Value Chains for Nutrition in South Asia: Who Delivers, How, and to Whom?’
but could get non-fortified flour (from Punjab mills) for 1,360 rupees. 
Consumers, including those living close to the licensed depot were 
unaware of  any fortification initiative.
It might be argued that constraints to the successful implementation of  
the NI project in AJK were partly related to the nature of  the region 
itself. While the high level of  reliance of  AJK mills on government-
supplied wheat from outside the region made AJK a good candidate 
for fortification, the fact that flour could be brought in easily from other 
non-fortification regions, also made the uptake of  fortified flour more 
challenging. We believe, however, that our analysis of  the wheat flour 
value chain as well as findings from AJK do have lessons for future 
interventions.
4.2 Current fortification plans
A new national-level plan for wheat flour fortification was initiated in 
2016 with a grant from UK Aid. This project is to be implemented by a 
consortium of  organisations (including NI) in partnership with provincial 
and federal governments. The wheat flour fortification element of  this 
project is similar in some ways to past initiatives. The project aims to work 
with licensed flour mills and the PFMA to provide feeders, pre-mix, and 
training for flour fortification. The main lesson from past projects which 
is reflected in the initial thinking about programme design is the need for 
prior attention to mandatory fortification in the provinces, and the setting 
up of  quality checking and enforcement mechanisms on the ground.15
5 Discussion
Technocratic optimism around the reduction in anaemia through wheat 
flour fortification is based on a number of  assumptions about consumer 
behaviour, producer incentives, and regulatory action that appear to 
be unrealistic. There are questions about whether or to what extent 
the simple checklist of  pro-nutrition value chains actions and processes 
identified by Maestre et al. (2017) are met by the generic design of  flour 
fortification programmes that has shown resilience in Pakistan.
The availability of  fortified flour to the target population is not simply 
an unresolved issue with respect to the relative size of  the chakki value 
chain which is not subject to any of  the fortification programmes. There 
are seasonal variations in the operation of  industrial mills as well across 
different parts of  the country. Existing evidence on the acceptability 
of  fortified flour (e.g. Mahmood, Zeb and Khan 2007), is based on the 
blind testing of  specially prepared batches of  flour which are identical 
except for the addition of  fortificants. A more realistic comparison will 
include the range of  products of  different qualities that are actually 
available to consumers across seasons and locations. The impact of  
wheat flour fortification on outcomes such as anaemia has been difficult 
enough to establish empirically under conditions where there is high 
and consistent exposure to fortified flour (Hurrell et al. 2010). It is 
likely to be considerably harder to show in a population where a large 
segment does not consistently consume fortified flour.
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There are critical issues with respect to producer incentives and 
regulation. The AJK fieldwork reiterated regulatory weakness in 
the government–mills relationship as, perhaps, a basic institutional 
constraint which has ramifications not only for the quantity and 
outreach of  fortifiable flour, but also on consumer perceptions about its 
quality. Mandatory fortification backed up by effective quality checking 
has been proposed as a solution to such problems (Gaffey et al. 2014). 
It is questionable, however, whether a technical response is sufficient to 
turn things around in an entire segment of  the industry that has evolved 
around the capture, not of  entrepreneurial rent (as envisaged in the 
value chains perspective), but of  public subsidy.
6 Conclusion
Wheat is perhaps the most important food crop in the country, and 
being the main source of  energy for large segments of  the population, 
it occupies a central place in food security and nutrition policies. The 
government has a strategic position in the wheat flour value chain, 
even though private sector stakeholders are responsible for virtually 
all of  the wheat grown and processed in the country. The persistence 
of  felt as well as hidden hunger suggests that the existing system has 
failed to ensure food security for the population, even if  it does prevent 
shortages and price spirals in urban markets. The system has, however, 
spawned inefficiencies, regulatory failures, and rent capture. Nutrition 
interventions such as wheat flour fortification need to be part of  a 
broader reform agenda that has food security as its central objective.
Given the depth of  the nutrition deficit in Pakistan, the delivery of  
essential nutrients through the fortification of  a widely consumed staple 
food will remain an attractive proposition. The scientific and technical 
aspects of  intervention design need to be seen alongside a range of  factors 
which shape consumer behaviour and producer incentives. Fortification 
interventions that are not attentive to institutional constraints that 
perpetuate inefficiencies along the value chain are not likely to deliver 
on their potential. Will engagement with these arrangements lead to 
an unwitting endorsement of  regulatory weakness and rent-seeking 
opportunity, or can it be used as a lever for much needed reform?
Wheat flour fortification and other food fortification initiatives across 
the globe are sustained, in part, by technocratic optimism which need 
to be corrected using other evaluative frameworks such as those offered 
by the value chains perspective. The possibility of  the involvement of  
the business sector through public–private partnerships tends to magnify 
this optimism by holding out the prospect of  commercial viability and 
long-term sustainability. The core narrative is appealing, indeed, as it 
combines the apparent certainty of  science with the logic of  the market. 
This case study of  wheat flour fortification interventions in Pakistan is a 
cautionary tale that highlights some costs of  ignoring process for output. 
It calls for taking a step back and asking whether existing public–private 
partnerships in the sector where the intervention is sought are ready for 
institutional reform.
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Notes
1 Technocratic optimism has been shown to affect expert opinion and 
decision-making in a number of  spheres (e.g. Clark, Robert and 
Hampton 2016), and is thought to be stronger among specialised 
experts in a given field compared with individuals with broader areas 
of  expertise (Tichy 2004).
2 In fact, as Bishai and Nalubola (2002) show, following the success of  
salt iodisation in eliminating goitre in the US Midwest in the 1920s, 
the championing of  other forms of  food fortification (notably that of  
wheat flour and bread with iron) was based on technocratic optimism 
rather than specific evidence of  impact.
3 Evidence of  positive impact of  flour fortification programmes is, 
understandably, even more ambivalent than that based on trials 
(Hurrell et al. 2010; Pachón et al. 2015).
4 A brief  account of  how the value chains perspective evolved with 
respect to nutrition is offered in the accompanying case study on the 
dairy sector in Pakistan in this issue (see Ansari et al., this IDS Bulletin).
5 The Women’s Work and Nutrition survey undertaken for LANSA 
in collaboration with the Collective for Social Science Research and 
the Leverhulme Center for Integrative Research on Agriculture and 
included modules related to the consumption end of  wheat flour.
6 These aggregate harvest shares are based on Dorosh and Salam 
(2008), who in turn, base their estimates on a survey of  farmers in 
Punjab and Sindh in the late 1990s.
7 Key informant interview, sector expert, Islamabad. Bran content of  
flour produced by chakkis cannot be extracted.
8 While the ex-mill price is regulated by the provincial food 
department, wholesale and retail price regulation comes within the 
domain of  other market regulation authorities in most areas.
9 The community-level fieldwork interviews cited in this article took 
place 13–30 May 2016.
10 Designating industrially milled flour as ‘fortifiable’ is to do with the 
available fortification technologies rather than the milling process itself.
11 Gaffey et al. (2014) record 1,200 mills, and the logframe of  DFID’s 
(UK Department for International Development, also UK Aid) 
food fortification project in Pakistan (DFID 2016a) notes a total of  
1,202 licensed mills. A 2015 presentation by an expert associated 
with the PFMA claims that there were 1,575 mills registered with the 
association (Awan 2015).
12 According to the programme director, the choice of  AJK for the MI 
fortification project was partly motivated by the fact that the region 
has a high proportion of  fortifiable wheat, and that there is greater 
government control over the supply of  grain (Naqash 2015).
13 It was surprising, given the claim that all local mills relied exclusively 
on government-supplied grain, that this AJK mill produced flour 
other than the regular fortified variety.
14 In the rural localities close to Muzaffarabad that we visited, retailers 
did not report stocking fortified ‘red’ flour. We were unable to visit 
more remote rural areas due to security-related travel restrictions.
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15 Gaffey et al. (2014) draw this lesson from the unpublished evaluation 
of  an earlier national wheat flour fortification project.
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